World Order

World Order is an impressive work that focuses on the geopolitical distribution of power. This is an enourmous topic and the author approaches methodically and continuously highlights insights with anecdotal personal experience. There are several key regional focuses that have both historical and modern day importance. The author focuses on Europe, the Middle East, Asia and the US. The chapters contain regional history and a perspective on cultural differences that create fracturing in understanding and negotiation. The author is always optimistic but makes sure to keep optimism in check with the realism learned through his experience in foreign policy. The author starts by discussing the distribution of power in Europe and how the Peace of Westphalia gave the model for stability. The author details the way in which after the devastation of the 30 years war, the peace that formed afterwards based on a focus of national sovereignty and balance of power led to a stable relationship among nation-states until the Napoleonic Wars. The discussion of Russian history is well weaved into the European narrative and its role in balancing or creating instability within the European sphere is discussed. The author discusses the rise of Germany and its ability to push Europe out of balance with its unification and the author discusses the first and second world wars and how the balance of power between France, Germany, Russia and the UK shaped events. The author moves on to Islam and Middle East. The author gives some background history to the spread Islam and the nature of the religion with respect to ideas like national sovereignty and balance of power. The author contends that they dont fit into the religion easily as Sharia law is given as the ultimate scale of justice. The author discusses the Ottoman Empire and how its alliances were often based on strategic advantage not perception of universal truth as evidence that the Westphalian concept of geopolitical stability included Islamic powers. The author discusses the relevence of current events like the Arab Spring and the emotions about Israel. The author also gives an overview of the richest Sunni nation- Saudi Arabia. The author then moves on to the ideological counterweight to the Westphalian system- Iran. The Iranianan religious rhetoric leaves no room for US values and sees no cooperative endgame. The narrative from the Ayatolla's is clearly demonizing. The author is hopeful that this is posturing and part of a strategy to keep a mandate rather than the unbending beliefs of the leaders and a representation of the populations views but the author warns of assuming that American values are naturally felt by all if just given the chance to be absorbed. The author discusses Asia and its different concepts of balance of power. The Chinese Empire throughout history saw itself as the center of the universe and their perspective on geopolitical order was that all states are culturally inferior and should be delivering tribute to the emperor (up until the opium wars). This perspective is fundamentally different from other regions in which warring parties constantly jostled for advantage. The repurcussion of this history is that China perhaps sees itself less bound by the international order constructed through the First and Second World Wars that it had no rule in constructing. China is looking to be the regional power but there are other nations who feel very differently, namely Japan and India. The US remains an important player balancing different interests in Asia with its naval presence. This will be a source of tension in the future as regional interests grow and relative power distribution moves towards China away from the US. The author spends time on the cultures of India, China and to a certain extent Japan. He discusses how their views of history and ethics can be fundamentally different to the enlightenment philosophy guided rhetoric that the US often argues is universal. The author finally moves on to the US. He discusses its often uniqueness in its perspective of foreign policy as an extension of its political philosophy rather than its national interest. The author discusses how the US is the only country to often believe it is acting for the betterment of society as well as for the propogation of liberty. This idealism often leads to overstretching and underappreciation of the requirement of the institutional architecture that allows for sustaining Americal values. The author does a quick history of US national policy from the Spanish American War up until the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. His discusses the two mindedness of the public in that they yearn for supporting the freedom and of democracy of others. But they tire of the difficulty of achieving it. The author spends a lot of time on the great stateseman in the US that he believes helped guide the nation to being a world power. World Order is well written and insightful. It is realistic in its analysis of the difference in perceptions of the role of foreign policy and balancing of world power. The author discusses the challenges we face in a nuclear age with rising probabilities of cyber warfare. The penetration of the internet has changed the nature of information/knowledge/wisdom and the author is concerned we have too much information at our fingertips at the expence of knowledge or wisdom and the perspective to appreciate the relevance of data. The concluding remarks are interesting but perhaps a little bit overly concerned. There are plenty of interested thinkers in the world today trying to be statesman (though not being able to think of many perhaps i should get on the same page as the author). World Order is a must read, as is On China for those who are considering that as well.

SUMMARY OF THE THESIS: The peace of Westphalia was an imperfect but still uniquely effective development in international relations, depending on recognition of the legitimacy and sovereignty of states while keeping a flexible structure committed to protecting the balance of power. Sectarian absolutists, among others, pose an alternative world order that depends on the triumph of their sectarian or political visions; this threatens the interests of all those dedicated to the Westphalian system. The book is also an anthropology of statecraft, examining the histories of many nations and regions. It's a handbook in this regard, and while specialists in cultures will have grist for the argument mill, it's a good text from which to begin those arguments. In the end, the book is less about what U.S. foreign policy should look like. For Kissinger, that's an art and a creative enterprise. Rather, it's about the way Kissinger thinks an intelligent mind should think about foreign policy. Because Kissinger is such a polarizing figure, I'll say here that he does deal also with the question of humanitarian motivations in interferences in sovereign states. These bits are worth reading to better understand his conception of the relationship between realpolitik and morality: I could have wished they were more fully worked out, but where Kissinger touches on it, it's thought-provoking stuff. Kissinger's knowledge of history and statecraft is so extensive, commanding, and even sensitive that you can't easily evade it. His understanding of the motivations of, for instance, Iran's leadership or Egypt's Arab Spring would sit well on a postmodern multiculturalist; but he indicates from history the ways in which the postmodernist multiculturalist should have serious reservations about that. Kissinger does not make Islam a target, however, but fits the religion into a remarkably coherent picture of the world and its troubles. The book is a wakeup call to an under-educated Western public (and leadership) that too often misunderstands the aims of diplomacy (including military action), and so wins the battles but loses the wars. Highly recommended for anybody who values world order, peace, and justice. My biggest critiques are that he under-develops many trends in modern foreign policy, such as the Obama Administration's goal of rebalancing toward Asia and minimizing U.S. roles in the Middle East. (Obviously that has huge implications for Israel, among many others.) There are many such lacunae. But it's a book full of concepts that one should have at one's mental fingertips in any discussion of U.S intervention, or of what world order ought to look like.

Review on "World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History" published by Henry Kissinger on September 9th 2014. This book offers great insight into the inner-workings and need-to-know basics of the concept of "World Order", human politics, history and our future. I wont go into extreme detail as there is simply too much information in the book itself to comment on in an review, but I will try to elaborate on a few issues I was left with, but make no mistake, this is a brilliant book written by a man with vast experience and intellect on the workings of global politics. Henry Kissinger's "World Order" is a great book for everyone interested in world history, politics and the concept about "World Order" based on the relation between power and legitimacy. Throughout history every great empire has sought to impose it's culture and values upon the world known to them, and rigidly trying to balance it's powers and legitimacy at the same time. Kissinger describes every great European, Middle-East, North-American and Asian empires who have since their conception strived towards fulfilling the inevitable conquest for an impending "World Order" where human beings are brought under an umbrella of global culture, values, economics and civil-rights. The book also focuses a lot on the relations between the Unites States of America and it's "nemesises"; Iran, Soviet Union (Russia), and China - and also goes into detail about the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea and Vietnam. The concept of "World Order" is so complex and often perscribed to an already established set of principles: The United States' democracy and capitalism, The Europeans "Westphalian System", the Islamic world's order based on religious legitimacy, China's history of isolationism, and mixture of communism and "confucian culture emphasizing harmony" and Soviet (Russias) "deconstruced" concept of international order through communism. The book does not deviate from these political ideologies, it merely relies on them to be the guiding principles of a future "World Order" where there is political hegemony, peace, harmony and prosperity for all. Whilst there must be some great nation(s) that "imposes" it's values upon other nations and that strives to balance the geo-political scene with values deemed to be important and invaluable to the human species, there will always be competing values, cultures and distinctly indifferent views on how to integrate these into our daily lives. There is also a great detail on each of the post-WWII presidents thoughts on the concept of "World Order" and what it contains, what it restrains and obtains, how it could and should be implemented and how it should be dealt with on the political scene. The reader should and would benefit from remembering that all these political insights and thoughts are products of the times they were constructed in; The Cold War, China's "Cultural Revolution" and "Great Leap Forward", USSR's fall, Middle-East conflicts and Central and East-Asian conflicts. There is also a chapter solely on the issue of Iran's Nuclear development and how the P5+1 countries tries to balance and dictate it's development and to "manipulate" it into being something Iran "cannot" use to dictate the balance of power in the Middle-East with Israel not surprisingly opposing it's every move and intention. Islamic history (and on topics of ISIS, the Caliphates, Saudi-Arabia, Persia) is also carefully described and analyzed, but not entirely criticized for it's clash with the "Western" ideologies and principles. In my opinion, "World Order" can never be based on religious principles or legitimacy as shown with the fall of the "Holy Roman Empire" in Europe, because it is such a egocentric and glorified concept that we are the creation of a "divine master" of the Universe that will "eventually save us all", because it will -- in time, in my opinion -- fall on it's own axis as it is not compatible with the political and social challenges we as a species face in the near and far future. The book is written by a man who has a lifetime of American and geo-political experience. It comes to my mind that he has without a doubt an invaluable set of insight into politics and the history of political development from the aftermath of World War II and up until this very day, but -- and there is in my opinion a great but -- he does not deal with nor elaborate on great issues of "World Order" such as the worlds economic model of free-market and capitalism and the ever increasing corruption from corporations to politics, the sad military industry complex of the worlds great powers and lesser nations worth billions of $, the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, the "pay for your interests" lobbyism of American and global politics, global famine and starvation, climate and global pollution, medicine and healthcare and the great risk of balancing "World Order" on a set of political and social principles incrompehensible to the majority of this planets population, which can eventually lead to an all-out war are we not willing to sacrifice and change our ways for the greater good on the path to our common future. This book is great food for thought, it puts forth guidance and analyzes the problems facing a "World Order" and is a must read for anyone slightly interested in geo-politics. For students of Political Science and Philosophy it will serve as a great detailing of the geo-political scene and workings of the great nations of power. For the younger generation it should serve as a factual perception of politics, but we should also learn and make sure that we in the future change and improve upon what is already established, as has forever been done and which has since changed the world immensely in tandem with technological and social development on a global scale. I dont have all the answers, and in my opinion, nor does Henry Kissinger, but the complexity of "World Order" requires a "World in Order" - one nation cannot do it alone, nor can it be solely one set of values and principles that forms it. Kissinger talks of not the improvement but the "reconstruction" of "World Order" based on todays political climate. And this reconstruction, is what human beings should work together for and dare not be afraid to embark on - as it is our sole purpose and destiny to make sure we build a viable future for the coming generations and strive for peace, prosperity and civil-rights on all fronts. I have not talked about every chapter in this book as this review would be too long for people to even bother reading, but I have tried to single out -- to me -- the most important topics and ideas in the book. Read the book for the entirety of the information it describes, it is a lot. I declare and acknowledge that I am a visionary, a dreamer of peace and disarmament of nations and especially nuclear weapons, I put my faith in science and technology to close the gaps between societies and culture - and I am a profound believer in the concept of "World Order". I personally do not believe it is up to the established bureaucracy or elected politicians to dictate and manage it's development. In Kissinger and many others view, it "requires" that "someone has to carry the banner and be the strong voice" -- but try to tell that to the 196 countries on this planet and the 193 members of the UN -- that someone "deserves" or "needs" the upper hand in this transition. It seems logic and rational given the status amongst Great Powers that USA, China and Russia, and eventually India, Japan and EU -- amongst others -- will dictate the future "World Order". But one day, we will all face threats grander than our own self-importance - whether it to be threats from the Universe (asteroids++), a tilt in the planets axis, climate change, or even facing again the threat of all-out nuclear war -- and then, just maybe then, we will have an even more "forced reason" to cooperate regardless of our indifferences, cultures and values. Let's hope we dont have to experience World War III for us humans to "meet up again to make sure it does not happen again". 5/5 stars from me for all the thoughts, ideas and feelings this book gave me! Worth every dollar!

If you have a serious interest in Asia or in foreign policy in general—whether you’re a policy wonk, an academic, or just a good citizen—I have a suggestion for you. Send an email to all of those to whom you owe service, such as employers and children, and ask for a three-day leave. Then take Henry Kissinger’s remarkable new book, World Order, to a hilltop without cell phone or television reception and read it, nay, study it. I assure you that you will feast on it for years to come. The book is erudite for a professor who long ago left the library stacks to become a public servant and, more recently, a super-consultant. For example, Kissinger points out, “Until the arrival of modern Western powers, no Asian language had a word for ‘Asia.’” (Few of us would be able to make such a statement given the number of such languages.) Hence, Kissinger suggests, in my words, that the concept of Asia is a Western construct. He uses this observation to highlight that Asia and, even more so, the East are much less homogenous than the West. Asia has no shared history— no equivalent of the Roman Empire or the Napoleonic Wars—no shared religion, and no set of shared, secular core values. Kissinger concludes that this is one major reason that the peoples of the region are much more given to the pursuit of national agendas than to pooling sovereignty or to forming strong, multilateral institutions or alliances. The book benefits from a cultural sensitivity, nurtured by Kissinger’s command of history, that is not found in many American writings on international relations. For example, Kissinger’s overview of Chinese history notes that for more than a thousand years China considered itself to be the center of the world and believed that its emperor was the ruler of “All Under Heaven.” Other peoples were offered a variety of rituals by which to pay homage to the emperor, but they were not granted an opportunity to play a role in shaping the world order. Thus, China’s tendency was to conceptualize the world order in hierarchical rather than balance of power terms. The book’s core subject is the tension between two major foundations of American foreign policy. On the one hand, Kissinger writes, the United States draws on a perspective first spelled out for the nation by Theodore Roosevelt—that is, a strongly realist perspective focused on national interests, geopolitical considerations, and the use of raw power. On the other, the United States draws on Woodrow Wilson’s idealism, which sought to implement on a global scale the kind of democratic regime the United States fashioned for its own people, to be achieved through international law and diplomacy rather than force. At times, the earlier Kissinger—the hard-core realist—shows up in the book; he almost mocks Wilson as a naïve man who moved into the presidency from academia after only two years in politics. After reviewing the various initiatives Wilson undertook, Kissinger states flatly that “no significant elements of these initiatives survived.” Moreover, Wilson’s idealistic approach to the world, which Kissinger shows all subsequent presidents evoked, did lead to disappointments, frustrations, and sudden shifts from overextensions to abrupt withdrawals-- in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In other pages, though, the Kissinger who is now closer to meeting his maker seems to have “found religion.” He waxes rhapsodic about the good Americans brought to the world when they set out to serve not the United States’ interests but rather the common good and others’ well-being. The United States joined wars in Europe to defend free peoples, not to gain territory or resources. It helped rebuild its enemies Germany and Japan, and it provided peace and stability to Asia that allowed the region’s nations to thrive. In short, idealism enjoyed some rather big paydays. Closely related is the issue raised by Kissinger’s high regard for an international order founded on a balance of power rather than on one superpower’s hegemony. The balance of power is associated with moral neutrality and letting each nation follow its own core values. Hegemony is associated with trying to “bring light to the heathens,” such as coercive regime changes to foster democracy, and imposing on other peoples the American view of the international order. Kissinger views the balance of power approach as the more reliable, although less idealistic, of the two. He observes that while a balance of power system does not lead to a good end state—an “end of history,” which anyhow may be elusive —it does provide an international system that through constant adjustments and rebalancing permits the nations of the world to manage matters, to make do. This may be all we can hope to achieve. This rich 420-page book contains much more that cannot here be captured. The reader will find few specific predictions and fewer prescriptions; instead, the book offers a comprehensive and deep analysis of the issues we face and the conceptual apparatus needed to reflect on them.

This is a highly readable book with wisdom scattered wide and deep among the many enlightening accounts from history and from Dr. Kissinger's own experience. I have not been a Kissinger fan, but now I am. I read the book to gain insights into how a sustainable order can be shaped for human expansion into the solar system and beyond. This is now a real world concern and no longer just a topic of science fiction. I am a member of the International Lunar Decade Working Group - see https://ildwg.wordpress.com/ working to launch in 2017, the 60th anniversary of the International Geophysical Year. The International Lunar Decade is a global event and process to lead from lunar exploration to the development of a self-sustaining space economy with the Moon becoming a wealth-generating platform for the expansion of mankind into the Solar System. Dr. Kissinger outlines how the Peace of Westphalia led to the recognition of the state as the principal actor in international relations and that peace resulted from a balance of rivalries. States negototiated the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 but included provisions that defined the heavenly bodies as the "province of all Mankind" that precludes sovereign claims by states to the Moon and other bodies in space. In 1979 the Moon Treaty was approved by the UN General Assembly and opened for ratification. Sixteen states have ratified the Moon Treaty and India, France and Romania have signed, but not ratified. The Moon Treaty is widely seen as not in force or not relevant or antithetical to the interests of the US and other major spacefaring powers. At this point there is no recognized international order for industrial and commercial activities on the Moon. If large deposits of platinum group metals or other valuable commodities were discovered on the Moon there is no agreed to process to govern the actions of states. Non-state actors could in principle seize the resources in the absence of an agreed to international regime. The Space Treaty, which has been ratified by by 103 states and signed by an additional 26 is the basis for space law. The Space Treaty limits the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for testing weapons of any kind, conducting military maneuvers, or establishing military bases, installations, and fortifications. If non-state actors seized parts of the Moon who could remove them since removal would involve the use of weapons on the Moon. The world order that arose out of the Peace of Westphalia was not based on principles or ideology but rather on a balance of forces. From my first reading of Dr. Kissinger's book it seems that he offers little guidance for the construction of international order in space. However, he does raise the successful example of the international order shaped under US leadership after WWII where Wilsonian principles of self-determination and the sovereign rights of states operate in a rules based global system. Can such a rules based international system be extended to space, or will the future emerge similar to the great colonial expansion from Europe starting from the 16th Century? If the desireable outcome is a rules-based international order in space can this be achieved without ratification of the Moon Treaty? The global environment now is shifting dramatically in the emerging multipolar world where democratic governance is not unversally recognized and the US no longer has a dominant economic or geopolitical position. Perhaps Dr. Kissinger would have insights about world order in a multipolar world with more than one world?

Many years ago I read with great interest "A restored world" where the young Kissinger recounted the Congress of Vienna and peace there achieved under the wise leadership of Metternich. This led me to acquire WORLD ORDER. The book presents an interesting collection of historical situations and events anchored this time in the Peace of Westphalia, but I expected more from an intellectual and man of action who was deeply involved in one of the most convulsive and traumatic periods of the twentieth century after the Second War World. China, Chile, Vietnam, Nixon and Watergate are just a sample of the different scenarios in which he had the opportunity to be relevant figure and where with a very particular sense of history, he managed to rescue for US policy the concept of Geopolitics, discredited because of what it meant as a legacy of the Hitler regime. If geopolitics is the study of international relations to understand, explain and predict the political behavior of states through geographic variables, climate, topography, population, natural resources and science, Kissinger's WORLD ORDER almost meets the criteria since it includes in the analysis all necessary variables except one of the most importants: NATURAL RESOURCES. Since drilling the first oil well in USA going through the Roosevelt-Saud oil deals after the Second World War, the Carter Doctrine on US strategic interests in the Middle East and ending with the tangle of oil and gas pipelines that cross or intend to do today against all odds in that area, oil has been the resource that guides the strategy of big powers in the Middle East. In WORLD ORDER's Index, oil is mentioned only 1 time, pg. 137, and that, as OIL EMBARGO. However, to the the fourth century BC Hindu thinker KAUTYLA and his book Arthashastra , Kissinger devotes a good 4 pages and repeated mentions. It is perhaps KAUTYLA's mixture of Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Bismarck with his REALPOLITIK the model that comes closest to the image that over time and after reading WORLD ORDER that I have of Henry Kissinger. The final chapter makes a recognition of the need to accept the current interdependence of nations to achieve World Order, but does not explain or clarify geopolitically in its almost 400 pages the basic question that the same book defines as key for designing a strategy on World Order: WHAT DO WE WE WANT TO ACHIEVE? and WHAT ARE OUR AIMS AND INTERESTS?

Surely there are few people in the world more qualified to write a book about geopolitics, present or historical, than Henry Kissinger. For a time of some 20 years he was directly involved in the decisions of American presidents on this very subject. Taking a broader view, Dr. Kissinger is involved in his subject (as I understand it even speaking to D. Trump since his election) even today and going back some 50 or more years! Without being too long, the book surveys the history of historical political orders in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, South America and Europe both Eastern and Western. He pays particular attention to the European "Peace of Westphalia" following the 30-years war in 1648. There is a theme here. Though there have been many European wars (and revolutions) since the 17th century they all occurred in a Westphalian context. Sometimes the context is respected, and sometimes violated, but even in the latter case, the peace process following the wars has either returned to a Wesphalian context and been, at least for a substantial time, successful in preserving the peace, or it ignored and violated that context leading rapidly to another war. The Marshall Plan following WWII an example of a return to Westphalian principles also the preservation of the French State after the depredations of Napoleon. By contrast, in contravention of those principles, French and English retribution against Germany following WWI resulted rather rapidly in WWII. Kissinger's focus on Westphalia sets up the problems he sees with Europe's and America's relation to the rest of the world. From the Western vantage point we look out on a world of nation-states and think to ourselves that as different as Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa might be, they all, in the end, want to preserve their statehood in relation to other states. One of Kissinger's observations is that this is not at all the case. China for example sees itself as the premier culture on Earth and lives within the present Westphalian system of nations for reasons of practical accommodation. The Middle East, and by extension the whole of the Islamic World, sees itself as the only legitimate and righteous inheritor of the entire world order! In Islam the Westphalian matrix is the most jumbled with nations like Saudi Arabia and Iran accommodating it for practical reasons, while others, particularly non-state actors, try actively to undermine it leaving thousands dead in their wake. Sub-Saharan Africa (with the exception of South Africa) is yet another story. The nations there are the result of recently (20th century) abandoned colonialism and though nominally nations, are riddled with leadership interested in little more than their own personal aggrandizement. Failed or failing states cannot participate coherently in such world order as presently exists let alone contribute to something better. Kissinger's first main point is that it is a mistake to continue treating with these nations AS IF they implicitly accepted the Westphalian context of nation states all "getting along". This doesn't mean we can stop working with these nations, but we have to be smarter about it and stop assuming they want merely to be like the Western world. Kissinger's other main point is that technology, the global issues it has already wrought (climate change for example), and the issues that have yet to fully manifest (mostly related to computers and biology), are stressing the existing system to a degree unparalleled in history. One is left with the impression that it is already too late. The existing "world order" has already become too inflexible, its momentum too great, to apply, and ENFORCE, global solutions to global issues. Kissinger doesn't say disaster is inevitable, but I do not see how any other conclusion is possible. In roughly the middle of the book Kissinger spends some time on the global effect of U.S. foreign policy from Theodore Roosevelt to Barrack Obama. He makes a number of observations here about the difference between the historical U.S. approach to foreign policy versus European statecraft, and notes of course that the foreign policy pendulum in the United States has shifted from episodic engagement to continuous engagement following the second world war. The force of U.S. engagement is derived from both economic and military power and importantly our willingness to use the latter now and then, though as it turns out mostly with inconclusive results. I notice he elides his own personal involvement in what might be termed "nations behaving badly" back in the 1970s and 1980s, but aside from this lacuna his point, his final point in the whole book, is that whatever else it does, the United States cannot now withdraw from the world order, even such as it is, without destabilizing everything! This book was written in 2014 the middle of Obama's second term. I wonder what he thinks now?

This book places modern international studies issues into historical contexts with analysis as to what affects current major foreign matters. Kissinger observes that President Harry Truman was proud both of the U.S. victories as well as its conciliations that brought defeated nations back into the "community of nations." The U.S. favors nations that have liberal economic systems, do not seek to conquer others, respect other nation's sovereignties, and have a participatory democratic system. Yet modern rules confuse this favoring system. There are non-Western countries that do not adhere by the expectations that the U.S. has although they indicate they are willing to move towards these goals. The 21st century challenges of weapons of mass destruction, global environmental concerns, genocide, and technological changes present new challenges. The vast changes in global communications present new ramifications. There has never been a global "world order" The 17th century saw one fourth of Central Europe's population die from war, starvation, or disease during the Thirty Years' War. The Westphalian peace sought to keep countries from attacking each other by creating a power equilibrium and agreement to respect other countries' sovereignty. Islam arose between Europe and Chia with a belief that Islam would spread through "realm of war". The Ottoman Empire claimed to be the legitimate governance of Islam. It believe it should become world''s one ermpire with Islam as the world's one religion, The United States began advocating for a world order that embraced peace through a balance and having democratic principles. The U.S. now struggles with using its power to update balances of powers and its principles. It does so recognizing the the concept of freedom cannot be spread through coercion. As Kissinger notes, "Order without freedom, even if sustained by momentary exaltation, eventually creates its own counterpoise; yet freedom cannot be secured or sustained without a framework of order to keep the peace." Order and freedom are interdependent. China with its Emperors and Islam with its Caliphs have histories of fallen dynasties replaced by new dynasties seeking to repair the fallen ones. Europe has a history fo divided governments and never had a unified identity. Charlemagne sought to become an Emperor protecting Christianity. Civil wars broke apart that dynasty within a century after Charlemagne's passing. Europeans sought to influence world affairs by saving souls as well as increasing their wealth from other countries. The Protestant Reform split Christianity in two. The balance of power shifted as Britain emerged as a sea power France sought dominance as well. Napoleon sought to unify Europe. Russia appeared as a dominant power. Germany has a history of either being too weak and thus prone to invasion or too strong and thus it became an invader. The European concept of creating a world order guided by its nationality disappeared after World War II. There is a serious effort to bring Russia into this unity. Islam and the Middle East present a disorder to European and American order. The rapid spread of Islam convinced its faithful that Islam could bring peaceful unity to the world, They could make peace with non-Islams, yet this should be done only to give Islam the strength to regroup for future incursions. The Islamic Ottoman Empire did not accept the legitimacy of the European order, The Ottoman Empire was larger and militarily stronger. Thus the 1526 alliance between the Holy Roman Empire, whose Habsburg government feared France, and the Ottoman Empire was a strange one on religious grounds. Later Habsburg and France created an alliance with Shia Persia creating tensions with the Sunni Ottoman Empire. Islam split into two factions. The Sunnis believe the Prophet Ali was the true trustee of the religion. The Shias believed the Sunni claimed authority. While there are today internal divisions between the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, the Shia Khomeini revolution and Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and Hamas, there are unified "in their commitment to dismantle the existing regional order and rebuild it as a divinely inspired region." Sayyid Quitb declared in his 1964 "Milestones" that all non-Isamic governments and societies are "illegal". This created for his followers a purity in the Islamic concept of creating a world order that is Islamic. The Arab Spring movement was mostly guided by a younger generation of Islamics. Democracy, an American value, was a stated goal. This created a conflict for some Americans who saw allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are un-democratic, challenged by anti-American democratic reformers. Should the United States stick to its values of spreading democracy and liberal reforms or does it stick by its political allies? Kissinger advises "Western tradition requires support fro democratic institutions and free elections" yet warns that the one time use of democracy to elect a religious dominated military regime destroys the progress towards democracy. The U.S. needs to encourage permanent democracy while considering the security risks to the U.S. this could entail. In Syria, the U.S. sought, through the United Nations, a coalition government. The United Nations resisted responding. ISIL, a jihadist group considered too extreme by al-Qaeda, militarily gained much ground in Syria and in western Iraq. Many Arabs for generations now believe that Irael illegally took Muslim land. Saudi Arabia is targeted by al-Qaeda and Iran. This has created a country torn in its support for Islamic radicalism while maintaining Western ties. Saudi Arabia attempted to please radical Islamics abroad while opposing those within its own country. They nurture Wahhabist schools throughout the world to show their support for the growth of Islam with in turn creates more jihadists that threaten Saudi Arabia and its Western allies. The Sunni states of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and to some degree Egypt and Turkey are in opposition to a Shia block of Iran, Bashar al-Assad's part of Syria, Nuri al-Maliki's parts of Iray, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Iran seeks to dominate the region. The Sunnis supports uprisings against Maliki in Iraq and Assad in Syria. Russia seeks to protect the Muslim part of its country against Syrian and Iraqi jihadists. The United States denounces the brutality of Assad yet recognizes that Assad's opponents are al-Qaeda and ISIL. Kissinger notes "it is tempting to let these upheavals run their course and concentrate on dealing with the successor states. But several of the potential successors have declared America and the Westphalian world order as principal enemies." Kissinger notes "revolutionary Islam has not, up to now, manifested itself as a quet for international cooperation as the West understands the term." Kissinger does recommend the U.S. and the West be open to "fostering cooperative relations with Iran" in hopes the Iranian people seek "a genuine reconciliation." In 1905, Japan became the first modern Asian country to defeat a Western country in itw war with russia. Kissinger views that modern Japan understands security realities and that it will base its relations with the U.S. on how they view U.S. credibility towards it rather than depending upon U.S. assurances. Chin had historically not acted, for centuries, to impose its political system onto other countries. It was upset when the West imposed its values on them. During the Cultural Revolution of Mao it had just four ambassadors worldwide. Mao began relaxing Chinese interventions with other countries in the 1960s. Kissinger notes the U.S. is allied with Japan and a partner with China. At the end of World War II, the U.S. created 60% of the world's Gross National Product. The U.S. was drawn to a draw in the Korean War. This destroyed the U.S. image of invincibility. China feared the U.S. was using Korea as a pretext to invade it.China lost some geopolitical ground as the war made U.S. committed to keeping China from gaining Taiwan. The Internet create so much information that it is difficult to use it all, Kissinger notes. He fear that historical information that cold be useful in foreign relations is often never seen by decision makers. The international order faces militias that do not consider sovereignties or borders, areas that are ungovernable or have failed governments, nations whose economic systems are at odds with their political systems which all creates strong challenges to all nations in a world that is more connected than ever before, according to Kissinger.

Kissinger viveu a História que conta; ajudou a moldá-la ou a viu acontecer de dentro. Seus comentários são endossados por um nível de propriedade que poucos podem se pretender ter em Relações Internacionais. A qualidade da edição é notável, com capa dura, impressão, lombada, tudo. Além de ser um dos mais interessantes da minha estante, é também um dos mais bonitos!

Garbage print, the font chosen is hurting everyone else eyes.

本格的な英文であり、暗唱もしたい名文でもある。また、これ以上ないという詳細な内容で、世界の歴史がわかってきた。

Preziosa guida per comprendere gli equilibri mondiali. Illuminante nel disegnare le relazioni tra gli Stati europei e le dinamiche che li hanno portato nel corso dei secoli alla guerra. Cina e Stati Uniti, protagonisti dei prossimi equilibri, li ho trovati meno interessanti, probabilmente perché ampiamente attesi e dalle dinamiche passate semplici. Nel complesso libro affascinante.

This book is a window to each civilisation's perception of world order - where they stood historically, and how they see the "other" in recent times. Kissinger uses the Westphalian system as a meter-stick of world diplomacy. We are defined by our biases. Readers should be aware that this is written from a former NSA's perspective, which means the book is from a point of view of both an academic and an insider, and that even if you agree or not with the author's prognosis on how the west should proceed diplomatically, it still opens up a discussion. Make sure you have your phone with a complete dictionary app when you read this. You will need it.